Earlier research has shown that the tragedy of the commons may be resolved by Folk theorems for dynamic games. In this article we graft on a standard natural-resource exploitation game the possibility to appropriate the resource through violent means. Because conflict emerges endogenously as resources get depleted, the threat supporting the cooperative outcome is no longer subgame perfect, and thus credible. The unique equilibrium is such that players exploit non-cooperatively the resource when it is abundant and they revert to conflict when it becomes scarce. The players' utility is shown to be lower even if conflict wastes no resources.
Introduction
The worldwide depletion of natural resources has been increasingly underlined by scientists, with some alarmist researchers forecasting the dramatic consequences of environmental depletion (Homer Dixon 1999) or human-induced climate change (Stern 2007) in the coming decades. The list of resources being critically degraded is extremely vast, as it includes such different goods as fish ponds, forests, oil and minerals, water sources, arable land, or even carbon-free air. Economists have been concerned with the question of exhaustible resources' conservation early on, with the main conclusions being that resources are spontaneously exploited in an economically efficient way, whearas full conservation of a resource is usually sub-optimal. Indeed, the famous Hotelling rule specifying the optimal rate of extraction of an exhaustible resource in a dynamic setting dates back to 1931 (Hotelling 1931 ). This simple rule states that natural resources should be seen as any other asset, and that the price of an exhaustible resource must therefore grow at the rate of return of the best alternative investment.
Yet, for the economically efficient management rule to emerge spontaneously it is necessary that the property rights over the resource be well defined and enforced (Coase 1960) . Property rights over mineral resources for instance, are usually well defined and enforced, and one can therefore expect their apparent over-exploitation to be economically efficient. On the other hand, there exist a host of resources known under the acronym common property resources (CPRs) whose property and exploitation are collective. Some key resources falling in this category are a clean environment (carbon-free air, non-polluted soil or water), international river basins, or wild fish. These resources give rise to a negative externality because agents fail to internalize the damaging effects of their own exploitation on the remaining potential exploiters, thus resulting in an overexploitation of the resource, also known as the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968 ). In a seminal article, Levhari and Mirman (1980) demonstrate that in the (Markov perfect) equilibrium of a dynamic resource exploitation game the resource is over-exploited as compared to the first-best central planner solution. 1 Some authors investigated institutional settings and strategies that yield in strategic games of CPRs the efficient outcome at equilibrium (Eswaran and Lewis 1984) . Having identified the backbone of the problem, Hardin advanced that given "the air and waters surrounding us cannot readily be fenced" the solution should be sought in "coercive laws or taxing devices" (Hardin 1968 (Hardin :1245 . The required institutions are, however, absent in many settings because of a lack of local (sub-national) or global (international) governance. Ostrom (1990) and Baland and Platteau (1996) narrate how local communities may succeed in overcoming the tragedy of the commons. Yet, the mechanisms identified by these authors necessitate a strong form of social capital that is absent in many CPR contexts. Extending Scholars thus conclude that provided the agents are sufficiently patient, CPRs can be managed efficiently. Yet, to the extent that efficiency does not imply conservation, the dynamic depletion of the resource cannot be excluded along the equilibrium path. The following Hobbesian question may then be asked: in a context of dynamic resource scarcities, could the players decide to turn violent to appropriate the remaining stock of resources? And if so, how would the anticipation of a violent confrontation influence the equilibrium strategies of the players? We address these questions in the present article.
The interplay of natural resources and conflict has attracted much attention lately as witnessed by the length of the section on this particular issue in the literature reviews on conflict (Blattman and Miguel 2010) In that respect, the endogenous collapse of Easter Island's society as documented by Diamond (2005) is very instructive. It is estimated that the Polynesians who were the first humans to have colonized the island did so circa 900 A.D. after traveling more than 1000 km on board of wooden canoes. At the peak of its development, it is estimated that this 160 square kilometer island hosted between 15 to 30 thousand inhabitants. The society was organized in hierarchical clans that peacefully competed with each other for power supremacy by erecting stone statues weighing up to 80 tons. To that end, the island's tallest trees needed to be cut down, as a result of which a rapid deforestation occurred. 2 By the time the first European expedition reached the island in 1722, deforestation of any tree measuring more than 3 meters height, including the two tallest species of trees the island used to harbor and that measure up to 15 and 30 meters, was complete. The exhaustion of this valuable natural resource implied an incapacity to build new large canoes permitting high sea fishing, as a consequence of which the rate of consumption of on-land food necessarily increased. This latter fact combined with the increase in population led to a depletion of the island's fauna that eventually forced the Easter Islanders to include in their nutritional diet a disproportionally high rate of rats. The erosion sparked by the deforestation accentuated the water supply problems of the island, hence further degrading the islanders' nutrition. Analyses of the settlements' middens, and of oral traditions conclude that the food scarcities became so important as to open the way for cannibalism. In 1680, as the situation must have reached dramatic levels of deprivation of all kinds, and with the elites proving unable to deliver their promises to their people, a sort of military coup occurred, followed by a prolonged period of intestine wars.
This historical example points at the violent consequences of resource depletion. According to Diamond, Easter Island's society plunged into chaos because of resource depletion that was provoked by their clans' permanent quest for prestige. Consistent with this approach is the analysis of Brander and Taylor who state that "Rather than being the cause of decline, violent conflict is commonly the result of resource degradation and occurs after the civilization has started to decline, as on Easter Island" (Brander and Taylor 1998: 132 ). Yet, one can reverse this question and explore the extent to which depletion of the island's resources has been a consequence of anticipated conflicts over the resources.
In this article we introduce the possibility of violently appropriating the stock of resources in a dynamic game of CPR exploitation. The main finding of the article is that when resources are dynamically depleted along the noncooperative (Markov-perfect) extraction path identified in the literature (e.g. Levhari and Mirman 1980), conflict will occur with certainty when resources are sufficiently depleted. As a consequence, the punishment threat for not respecting a cooperative agreement stops being credible (i.e. subgame perfect), thus implying that cooperation itself breaks down. Interestingly, even if conflict intensity is extremely low or nil at equilibrium, the resulting breakdown of cooperation implies that the players' utility will always be lower as compared to a setting devoid of conflict because of the pre-conflict over-exploitation of the resource.
This article contributes to the expanding field of conflict theory. Whereas the initial writings mainly focused on static properties of conflict models, the dynamic dimension has received increased attention lately. Some interesting issues that have been explored are the timing of conflict when the players' strength evolves either exogenously Garfinkel (1990) and Yared (2010) both investigate the scope for reaching peaceful agreements in repeated games of resource exploitation and conflict. Garfinkel (1990) was the first to study Folk theorems for conflict models and established that in a repeated prisoner-dilemma type of setting, peace can be supported as an equilibrium for sufficiently patient players. More recently, Yared (2010) extended the analysis to a context involving information imperfections, while also considering the harshest existing subgame perfect punishments. In Yared's model, because of informational imperfections, temporary punishments under the form of non-permanent wars may occur along the equilibrium path. Common to these two articles is the repeated nature of the game, which implies that the resource at stake is a constant flow of wealth. Such models are well suited therefore to formalize potential conflicts over the control of economic sectors and territories. In our setting, the resource is instead conceptualized as a stock that regenerates at some non-negative rate, thus implying that our model captures better the dynamics of finite resources, whether they regenerate or not. Acemoglu et al. (2012) is perhaps the closest contribution to ours because they consider a dynamic game of trade and conflict over an exhaustible resource whose value is a function of its scarcity. In exploring the conditions favoring the peaceful dynamic trade as opposed to an invasion by a resourceless player, Acemoglu et al. (2012) show that if the depletable resource, which is located in a single country, is exploited competitively, individual firms fail to internalize the negative externality of their individual extraction on the increased likelihood of foreign intervention. The high prices that this exploitation generates in the future, boosts the future incentives for conflict, thus feeding back in the firms' short run incentives to exploit the resource, which eventually triggers immediate conflict. Whereas both our models are dynamic and feature an exhaustible resource, they differ along several dimensions. We model a CPR management game where the resource may be privatized through conflict, whereas in Acemoglu et al. (2012) , one player has access to the resource via the market alone. In Acemoglu et al. (2012) conflict requires no investments in weapons, and the outcome is exogenous (assailant wins with unit probability).
Instead, we endogenize the players' arming decisions and winning probabilities. Far from being negligible, this modeling assumption implies that the agents' equilibrium fighting investments are a decreasing function of the value of the prize. As a consequence, despite larger prizes being more attractive at first sight, the opportunity cost of fighting over their control counterbalances the former force, eventually pushing the players to increasingly opt for a peaceful exploitation of the resource. Lastly, we extend the analysis to the concept of subgame perfection instead of focusing on the subset of Markov perfect equilibria.
In the next section we develop a standard benchmark model of dynamic resource exploitation and we then introduce the possibility of reverting to violence in this same game. Section 3 concludes.
The Model
We consider an infinite time horizon game of a renewable resource exploitation. Two players labeled 1 and 2 simultaneously decide at each time period the amount of resources to exploit from a common pool of renewable resources. In time zero the world is endowed with a stock of r 0 resources that grows at a linear rate γ. 3 We denote player i's use of renewable resources in time t by x i,t , i = {1, 2}, thus implying that the resources available in period t, r t , equal (1 + γ)(r t−1 − x 1,t−1 − x 2,t−1 ). The exploited renewable resource is transformed into a consumable with a one-to-one production technology.
The utility of any player i in time t from the consumption of x i,t resources equals ln(x i,t ). We allow for decision-makers 1 and 2 to attempt obtaining control of the common pool of resources at any time period t through violent means. More specifically, at each time period, players 1 and 2 decide whether to initiate a conflict over the appropriation of the available stock of common resources or not, given that if either player is willing to initiate conflict, a violent confrontation occurs. The timing is such that in a first stage the players simultaneously decide whether or not to initiate conflict. In a second stage they simultaneously decide their resource extraction levels and the number of weapons to produce given that the players' fitness in conflict is a function of these weapons.
We designate by g i,t the strength of player i at time t. When conflict occurs in time t, a share ϕ(g i,t , g j,t ) of the resources are destroyed, and player i eventually retains control of a share p(g i,t , g j,t ; α) = gi,t+ϑia gi,t+gj,t+a of the remaining stock of resources. We make the following assumptions on the function ϕ(g i,t , g j,t ):
We are therefore assuming that war is increasingly destructive for higher (individual or aggregate) levels of the strength of the contestants involved in the conflict.
The parameter ϑ i captures some de facto partition of the resource in case of weaponless conflicts, and we impose that ϑ i = ϑ j = 1/2. The parameter a gauges the difficulty of modifying that sharing when entering into an armed confrontation. Using subscripts to designate partial derivatives, we can see that p g k ,a < 0 for k = {i, j} thus implying that the higher the value of a the lower the marginal benefit of engaging forces in the conflict.
Given this setting, the discounted life-time utility of player i at any time period equals:
Where δ stands for the discount rate.
At any time t where conflict is not occurring, the resource constraint reads as:
If conflict is decided in time t, the intertemporal utility of player i is given by (1), whereas the resources that come under his control in t + 1 equal:
Lastly, in any post-conflict yet non-conflictive time period, the resource constraint of i reads as:
We focus on the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game. To fully grasp the implications of the conflict dimension, we proceed sequentially by first assuming that the players do not have the possibility of fighting, and we then relax this assumption.
Peaceful world
As in any CPR problem, the players disregard the negative externality of their resource-use on the other player's payoff. This in turn implies a resource over-exploitation. As a starting point, we derive the Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) of this game which constitute a sub-set of the the game's Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE). The MPE of this dynamic game consists in the players maximizing equation (1) subject to the resource regeneration constraint without, however, conditioning their actions on the game's history. We denote the associated strategies by nc (for non-cooperative). In time period t, the maximization problem for player i therefore reads as:
We denote by V nc i (r t ) the value function for player i given the resource stock r t , meaning that the indirect utility of player i can be expressed as a Bellman equation:
Next, given the assumed regeneration rule, the above expression can be written as:
Differentiating (7) with respect to i's decision variable, x i,t , we obtain:
To derive the equilibrium, we first inquire whether x nc i (r t ) may be a linear function of its argument so that
x nc i (r t ) = λ i r t . This assumption implies that the stock of resources in time period t + 1 can be expressed as
Replacing in equation (5) the decision variables by the players' best responses, together with using the regeneration rule gives us:
Rearranging the terms of (9) gives us:
Which in turn allows us to obtain:
Substituting this last equality in the optimality condition (8) gives:
Combining this expression with the analogous condition for player j implies that λ nc 1 = λ nc 2 . Using this fact and simplifying the above expression, we obtain:
This last expression stands for the (constant) share of available resources consumed by each player under the noncooperative scenario. The proportion of the stock of resources which is preserved from on period to another therefore equals (1 + γ)δ/(2 − δ). 4 After some algebraic manipulations, the life-time utility of country i in the non-cooperative scenario therefore equals:
A first result is worth highlighting at this stage:
In the present depletable resource exploitation game the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium is such that the players' strategies are linear in the available stock of resource.
For the proof see Appendix A.1.
In the game under consideration, the players produce a negative externality on each other, thus resulting in a sub-optimal equilibrium. In the absence of regulating institutions, Folk Theorems for dynamic games allow us to overcome this sort of inefficiency by appropriately selecting the punishment to be applied on deviation from an agreed path of actions. Given that we focus on SPE, for a punishment to be credible it oughts to be subgame perfect. One such punishment consists in both players reverting to their MPE strategies after either player deviates from the cooperative path. We shall therefore explore under which conditions the socially optimal outcome (first best) is supported by a trigger strategy. 5
Assume that if an agreement is reached in time period t, player 1 receives property rights over a share α of the total stock of resources r t for as long as the deal is sustained, with the resulting share (1 − α) accruing to player 2. 6
Player i's maximization problem is again given by (5) with the difference that the law of motion of the resources is now given by: α i r t+1 = (α i r t − x i,t )(1 + γ). Applying the same techniques as above, we can derive the per-period share of resources under the control of player i that will be used by player i if the agreement was respected forever: 5 Dutta and Radner 2009 derive in a very general setting cooperative equilibria that are sustained by the threat of reverting to Markovian strategies. Notice that after Abreu's (1988) seminal contribution on repeated games, and the extensions of this theory to dynamic games (see Sorger 2005) we know that a host of more elaborate punishment schemes may be constructed. Using such harsher punishments facilitates cooperation. Yet, as will become clear in the next section, these are not subgame perfect strategies when introducing the conflict dimension, and hence they play no role in this article. 6 We opted for this way of modeling cooperation for analytical convenience. The alternative approach where a central planner decides the players' extractions out of the stock of resources yields results that can be perfectly replicated with the present approach when setting α i = α j = 1/2 (see Appendix A.2). The approach adopted in the core of the text allows us however to incorporate non-symmetric cooperative schemes in a more flexible and analytically tractable way, while also simplifying the comparisons with the subsequent conflict scenario.
This implies that the stock of resources is dynamically depleted if δ(1 + γ) < 1. Country 1's life-time utility under this cooperative scenario is therefore equal to:
We have thus derived the cooperative solution to this depletable resource exploitation game. The next proposition summarizes the conditions for this outcome to be a SPE under Nash reversion strategies:
Proposition 2. The first-best solution of the resource exploitation game (α i = α j = 1/2) is always supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium.
For the proof see Appendix A.3
Having shown that in this game cooperation is always an equilibrium outcome in a resource exploitation game, we explore the consequences of the players having the possibility to violently appropriate the stock of resources.
Violent world
Consistently with the game's structure exposed earlier, if fighting is decided in time period τ the utility of player 1 in time period τ equals (1) given that from period τ + 1 and onwards player 1 controls a share g1,τ +a/2 g1,τ +g2,τ +a of the stock of remaining resources. This partition may be contested again in the future, but this will never be optimal for the players. In other words, the optimization problem of country 1 from period τ + 1 on, in case it is victorious in τ , is given by the cooperative problem described earlier after having set α i = p(g i,τ , g j,τ ). If conflict is decided in time period τ , we can therefore write country 1's utility in time period τ as:
Where r τ +1 = (1 + γ) (1 − ϕ(g 1,τ , g 2,τ )) r τ − i={1,2} (x i,τ + g i,τ ) .
Optimizing (16) for player 1 with respect to g 1,τ and x 1,τ , and then dropping the time subscripts for the weapons' levels for notational reasons we obtain the following F.O.C.s:
Imposing symmetry and simplifying allows us to re-write condition (18) as:
Simplifying condition (17) and substituting for the optimal extraction rates as given by (19) gives:
Where this expression implicitly defines g 1 (r τ ) = g 2 (r τ ) = g(r τ ).
Using a short notation for the optimal levels of weapons, the utility of player i in time period τ thus equals:
The implicit description of g * (a, r) as given by (20) allows us to deduce the following result: For the proof see Appendix A.4
The intuition of Lemma 1 is straightforward. The first part is a standard result in the conflict literature: the larger the prize at stake, the more effort the contestants will invest in attempting to grab the resource. The second part of the proposition tells us that the smaller the ability of the constants to influence the partition of the resource by detaining weapons, the smaller will be their investments, with conflict eventually being weaponless for high values of a. For the remaining of the article we assume that a >ā so that for very low levels of resources, conflicts are weaponless because the players do not find it optimal to attempt influencing the de facto sharing of the resources.
Lemma 1 is very useful in showing that the MPE identified in the previous section is no longer an equilibrium
in the present section:
In a depletable resource exploitation game with conflict, exploiting non-cooperatively the resource for ever is not a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy.
For the proof see Appendix A.5.
We have therefore shown that in the game under consideration the non-cooperative equilibrium identified in the previous section is no longer an equilibrium because of the players' incentives to declare conflict when resources are sufficiently depleted. This implies that the conflict path grants both players a larger payoff to the non-cooperative path. It is therefore interesting to compare the utility under (eternal) cooperation to the utility under conflict. This is the object of the next lemma:
Lemma 3. For sufficiently low levels of resources, eternal cooperation is dominated by conflict.
For the proof see Appendix A.6.
This lemma constitutes an important building block of our main result because it establishes the impossibility of sustaining cooperation for low levels of resources. The intuition behind this result lies in the costless nature of conflict when the resources are sufficiently depleted: as the opportunity cost of defining property rights over the stock of resources is nil, cooperation can be mimicked at no cost, thus implying that players prefer free-riding on their opponent's cooperative effort in the short run by themselves acting non-cooperatively. Because both players adopt the same reasoning, cooperation is not sustainable.
Significant contributions to repeated and dynamic games have underlined the possibility of having alternative (to the non-cooperative strategy) subgame perfect strategies supporting the cooperative equilibrium. We are therefore called to explore such possibility in our framework. The following lemma establishes the absence of such strategies in our game.
Lemma 4. For sufficiently low levels of resources, the conflict strategy is the unique subgame perfect strategy.
For the proof see Appendix A.7.
Lemma 4 identifies the conflict strategy as the unique subgame perfect strategy of the game for low enough levels or resources. In other words, if the resource is dynamically depleted, the players will revert to conflict at some point in the future with certainty. As conflict is associated with a violent establishment of property rights, we have shown that in this game of dynamic resource exploitation, the infinite strategic interaction characterizing the peaceful version of the game breaks down. The players will interact strategically for a finite number of time period, before deciding to appropriate part of the common resource through conflict.
A relevant question is whether the cooperative equilibrium may still be implemented in the short run by a threat to reversion to non-cooperation for a finite number of time periods in case of non-compliance, before declaring conflict. The following Proposition establishes that cooperation can never be sustained as an equilibrium strategy in this game:
In a depletable resource exploitation game where players can revert to violence to appropriate the common pool resource and where a >ā, the equilibrium is such that players exploit non-cooperatively the resource when the stocks of resource are abundant, whereas they revert to conflict if the resource becomes scarce.
Proof. The proof of this Proposition is immediate: by designating by τ the time period when it is profitable to deviate from the cooperative path of play, and then initiating conflict in τ + 1, it is direct to deduce that in τ − 1, the players will adopt the same reasoning. Proceeding backwardly and replicating the reasoning completes the proof.
Proposition 3 highlights the important implications of introducing conflict in a dynamic game of CPR management. Interestingly, the prospect of conflict makes off-the-equilibrium-path threats non credible, when these same threats would have supported the First-best outcome in the absence of conflict. Thus, conflict may be expected not to occur for a long period of time, yet, the very expectation of conflict induces the players not to cooperate. Because the conflict decision is endogenous, when opting for conflict the (symmetric) players necessarily fare better than by exploiting the resources non-cooperatively. This implies that the unique (Pareto-dominated) non-cooperative equilibrium of this game ceases being an equilibrium with the introduction of conflict. Yet, while conflict removes from the game its worst equilibria, it equally eliminates the Pareto-superior ones as the cooperative equilibrium can no longer be sustained. It is therefore noteworthy to emphasize that irrespectively of the amount of weapons invested in the -possibly distant -conflict, the following corollary holds true:
The anticipation of conflict accelerates resource depletion as compared to a cooperative path of play, and reduces the players' equilibrium utility.
The proof is straightforward and thus omitted.
This finding must not be mis-interpreted as conflict reducing the players' utility because of either the opportunity cost of conflict, or the direct inefficiencies tied to fighting activities. The reduction in the players' utility is primarily linked to the inability to sustain the cooperative Pareto-superior equilibrium, because the punishments supporting this equilibrium are no longer credible.
Concluding remarks
We introduced in a standard dynamic game of common pool resource management the possibility of privatizing the common resource by reverting to conflict. If conflict is waged in the presence of high stocks of resources, the players invest important amounts in conflict. The high opportunity cost of this operation coupled with the potentially destructive nature of heavily armed conflicts induces the players to refrain from initiating conflict. For low levels of resources, however, conflict becomes a profitable option. The implications of this finding are profound because the strategies that are traditionally used to sustain cooperation are no longer subgame perfect. As a consequence, the cooperative equilibrium breaks down. In the presence of abundant resources, the players exploit non-cooperatively the CPR in expectation of conflict occurring after the stock has been sufficiently depleted at some point in the future. Importantly, compared to the cooperative equilibrium, the unique equilibrium in this CPR game with conflict involves a faster depletion of the resource, and lower utility levels for the players. This is true even when the players expend minimal resources in conflict.
A.1 Unicity of MPE
Proof. To prove that the linear strategy σ i (r t ) = λ i r t is the unique MPE, we proceed by contradiction by positing that there exists some other MPE. Notice first that given the problem's symmetry, any equilibrium will be symmetric.
Indeed, the value function being a concave function of its argument, it follows that the maximization problem (1) yields a unique solution for any r t , thus implying that both players will be playing the same strategy. We denote the equilibrium extraction rates of the non-linear MPE byx i,t (r t ), and use the following concise notation:
and similarly for any other strategy). Assume that
By the problem's concavity, it follows that V * i,t <V i,t . At optimality the F.O.C. is such that:
This implies that x * i,t−1 >x i,t−1 for both players, which in turn yields r * i,t <r i,t . Yet, this last inequality implies
Yet, deriving the Euler equation of our problem we obtain:
But this implies a contradiction with V * i,t+1 /V * i,t >V i,t+1 /V i,t . We therefore conclude that the MPE is unique, and because the linear strategy profile identified in the article is a MPE, it is also the unique MPE.
A.2 First-best
The first-best solution of the resource exploitation game is given by the solution to the central planner's following problem:
With linear strategies the value function of this problem can be written as:
This enables us to derive the optimal extraction rate for any individual i:
The resource constraint then reads as:
Hence implying that any player's life-time utility in time t equals:
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The payoffs from eternal cooperation are given by (15) . If player i deviates from the cooperative agreement at some time period t, both players play non-cooperatively forever after. The optimal consumption of player i in case of deviation is given by solving the following problem:
Optimizing yields:
which using the fact that λ c j,t = (1 − δ) eventually yields:
Player i's deviation payoff is thus equal to:
Comparing the payoffs, after simplifying and using the fact that α i + α j = 1, we obtain that V c i,t > V d i,t if the following expression is satisfied:
As the bracketed expression of the third term is smaller than unity, the third term is positive, thus implying that the above condition is satisfied if the first two terms are greater than zero, which can be written as:
Consider the case where α i = 1/2. As X(0) = X(1) = 0, the condition is verified for both δ = 0 and δ = 1. It is then sufficient to show that X is a concave function of δ to conclude that the inequality is verified over the interval [0, 1]. The second order derivative X equals:
A.4 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We first show that ∂g/∂a < 0 ∀r. Rewriting expression (20) , applying the implicit functions' theorem, and collecting terms, we obtain:
The numerator is positive, whereas the unique non-negative term in the denominator is ϕ g (2g + a)(2 + δ). Using condition (20), we deduce:
Hence, we have:
With the last inequality constituting a sufficient condition for the denominator of (A-11) to be negative.
Next, because the first term of (20) tend to zero when a becomes arbitrarily big, it follows that for any finite r, there exists a value of a(r) such that g * (a, r) = 0 for any a ≥ a(r), and g * (a, r) > 0 for a < a(r). We denote this value byā(r). Moreover, denote byā =ā(0). Using the fact that ∂g/∂r ≥ 0, we deduce that for any a ≥ā, there exists some stock of resources below which conflicts are weaponless.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Lemma 2 holds if lim Using the game's symmetry, we can drop the individual subscripts. After simplifying we obtain:
And when replacing by the optimal extraction rates this expression becomes:
Or, ln (r t − 2g) + δ ln (1 − ϕ(g, g)) 2 > ln (r t ) − δ 1 − δ ln (2 − δ) (A-15)
Using Lemma 1, we obtain that for any a >ā, when resources are sufficiently depleted inequality (A-15) is verified if:
We then optimize the RHS of this inequality w.r.t. x nc 1 (x c 2 ), and making use of the Envelope theorem we obtain the next F.O.C.:
Replacing for x c 2 = α 2 (1 − δ)r t , and solving for x nc 1 eventually gives us:
x nc 1 (x c 2 ; r t ) = (1 − δ)(1 − α(1 − δ))r t (A-21)
Substituting in (A-18) and taking r t ≤r(a), gives the following expression:
As cooperation is more likely to be sustainable with α 1 = α 2 = 1/2, should the above expression be verified for α = 1/2, it will equally hold for any α 2 = 1 − α 1 > 1/2, whereas for α 2 = 1 − α 1 < 1/2 the analogous condition would hold for player 2. Replacing for α 2 = 1/2 and simplifying gives:
And this last inequality is always true with strict inequality for δ ∈]0, 1[.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Assume there exists some subgame perfect punishment strategy different from the Nash trigger strategy. Using superscript p to designate this strategy, assume first that V p 1 (r t ) ≤ ln(x nc 1 (x c 2 ))+δV nc 1 ((1 + γ)(r t − x nc 1 (x c 2 ) − x c 2 )) for r t <r(a). Then, the p strategy is not subgame perfect. If on the other hand V p 1 (r t ) > ln(x nc 1 (x c 2 )) + δV nc 1 ((1 + γ)(r t − x nc 1 (x c 2 ) − x c 2 )), then using inequality (A-17), we deduce that V p 1 (r t ) > V c 1 (r t ). We therefore reach a contradiction because this would imply that the c strategy is not the first best solution of the game. Hence, any such p strategy violates the subgame perfection criterion.
